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A Privacy-Aware Localization Service for Healthcare Environments

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PETRA 2011: Privacy and Security in Pervasive e-
Health and Assistive Environments Workshop (PSPAE)

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Overview



- Motivation and Idea
 - Data Owner controlled privacy policies
 - KopAL System and Requirements

- Policy languages for localization data

- Conclusion and Outlook



Motivation and Idea

Data Privacy for Location Services



Privacy Definition:

“...the right of individuals to determine for themselves **when, how** and **to what extent** information about them is communicated to others.”

P. Ashley and G. Karjoth, 2003


Controlling Data Access Policies

Data User controlled Policies

- The **Data User** specifies and publishes the access and use policy for private data.
- The **Data Owner** has to trust this policy and releases his/her data.

Data Owner controlled Policies



- The **Data Owner** specifies the access and use policy for data.
- The **Data User** enforces this policy.



KopAL: Assistance for Patients with Dementia




- KopAL has been introduced by Sebastian Fudickar (PETRA2011, Workshop 1)
 - Electronic assistance for patients suffering from dementia
 - Emergency call function
 - Speech-based appointment reminder
 - Developed at Potsdam University, Germany
<http://www.cs.uni-potsdam.de/bs/research/al/index.html>



KopAL: Assistance for Patients with Dementia



- Localization function in KopAL:
 - Localization of patients that have lost orientation
 - Notification of nursing staff about dangerous patient movement
 - Localization of lost or misplaced devices (requested by staff)



Data Privacy for Location Services




Question: How can the sensitive private location data of a patient be protected in the presence of different actors?

- Sensitive data stored as semi-structured XML-Documents
 - Location data
 - Access Policy
- (Distributed) Access Control Framework
 - Requests to resources must be evaluated at time of resource access
 - Deployment of trusted infrastructure
- Automated enforcement of authorisations

Data Privacy = Access Control + Usage Control

Workflow for Localization Assistance in KopAL



- Integrated management of access rights via Sticky-Policies
- The protected data are stored together with the usage policies as a Sticky Policy Object and can be referenced anytime by the system

Data Privacy for Location Services




Use-case requires predefined Policy-Set:

- No access
 - Position updates are not send and stored
- Emergency only
 - Position updates are send
 - Caretaker can access location if 'Emergency Button' is pressed on the device
- Restricted access
 - Position updates are send
 - Caretaker can access location to find misplaced device (logging required?)
 - Caretaker is informed when person enters critical regions

Sticky Policies

- The Policy-Store holds:
 - Meta Policies
 - User-generated Policies
- Application data about the patient includes:
 - User-ID
 - Positioning Algorithm
- The Location-Update contains information about:
 - Location Data
 - Timestamp






Policy Languages for Localization Data

XACML




- eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) developed by OASIS, current version 2.0
- Generic Policy Language, as well as Request/Response Language



Geopriv – Common Policy



- Developed by the Geopriv WG of the IETF, RFC 4745
- Targeted Policy Language for expression of localization policies




Geopriv Common Policy



- (Some) characteristics of Geopriv:
 - Only positive authorisation rules allowed
 - Complete ruleset needs to be evaluated
 - No ability to explicitly specify purposes for data-use in policies
 - Targeted expressions for location transformation (obfuscate, reduce precision, ...)
 - Policy combining is narrowly defined (generates the union over the matching permissions in the rule-set, returning the maximum value across the permission-set)
- Currently no known implementations

XACML Datamodel



- Location data object:
 - Send periodically every 30 seconds
 - Server only stores a short history of values
 - Every location update contains complete policy
 - Location update is encrypted using RSA



Conclusion and Outlook

Conclusion



- Privacy friendly design
 - Coarse localization pattern
 - Short data retention periods
 - Policy protected data

- Minimal intrusion upon the user
 - Set up once, continuous protection
 - Patients can change their policy settings

- Extensions are under evaluation:
 - Invite other patients to signal presence
 - Use localization data to place reminders on wall terminals
 - ... (limited by patient needs)

A Privacy-Aware Localization Service



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